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1.

INTRODUCTION 1

Residential mobility programs are now seen as a successful strategy
for helping low-income families. Programs that help low-income families
move into middle-income neighborhoods have had some notable successes in improving family living conditions and have led to improved

employment for adults and improved education and employment for
youth. However, we must not only evaluate programs' effectiveness, we

must also consider under what conditions they are effective. While the
former task is commonly done, the latter is not. Most policy discussions

consider the outcomes of programs, but either ignore conditions or relegate them to a technical section on methods. Conditions, however, may
be crucial to programs' success.
This paper suggests that while programs are usually viewed as
serving their clients, some programs must also serve other parties to be
. Professor of Sociology, Education, and Social Policy, Northwestern University;
B.A., Yale University; M.A., Ph.D., Harvard University. Professor Rosenbaum specializes in research on work, education, and housing opportunities and has published
three books and many articles on these subjects. Professor Rosenbaum is directing studies of low-income black families in white suburbs, and a study of a mixed-income housing
project, Lake Parc Place. Professor Rosenbaum's research has been described in national
media and has contributed to the federal Moving to Opportunity program.
.. Fellow, Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research; B.A., M.A.,
Northwestern University. Ms. Miller's past work has focused on employment issues for
non-college bound youth, and her current project is a follow-up of the children in the
original Gautreaux study.
1 The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, provided support for the studies reported here. Nancy Fishman, Cathy Flynn,
Julie Kaufman, Marilynn Kulieke, Patricia Meaden, Susan J. Popkin, Len Rubinowitz,
and Linda Stroh made major contributions to these studies. This paper benefited greatly
from the comments of Alexander Polikoff and Margery Turner. Of course, the ideas expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any other
individual or organization.

1426

1997]

EFFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY PROGRAMS

1427

effective. In the instance of residential mobility, programs must gain the
cooperation of landlords and neighbors. If landlords refuse to participate, units will not be available. If neighbors do not cooperate, they may
make the transition difficult for participants; they may refrain from offering help and support; or they may even mobilize political opposition to
the program. Programs that fail to serve these key groups may be less
effective in helping clients.
Program screening is a key factor that affecting program success.
Screening eliminates people who are not prepared to meet the demands of
the program. No less important, screening also certifies to outsiders that
the program's clients are capable of meeting appropriate demands. Programs that serve low-income people run special risks of inadvertently
conferring stigma to their participants, and this stigma may undermine
outsiders' support.
In contrast, screening can counterbalance such
stigma. We argue that programs that are dependent on other people's
actions for their success must strive to provide certification and warranties about their clients that persuade these groups to cooperate. Rather
than screening being a quiet or informal process, this view suggests that
programs should pose formal criteria and certify the favorable qualities
that their clients possess.
Job training literature is instructive on this point. Evaluation studies
find that graduates of some job training programs actually obtain lower
earnings than control groups that receive no training. 2 The programs offer good training, but, while they may improve all participants' capabilities, employers do not have much confidence in the programs' graduates.
We have speculated that the wide diversity in programs' graduates undermines employers' confidence.' Employers imagine that every participant carries the risks of the worst one.
In contrast, Focus/Hope, a Detroit-based job training program that
serves low-income blacks, has stringent entrance requirements and rigorous training. This program is able to certify the quality of every graduate. Like other job training programs, this program also runs the risk of
inadvertently conferring stigma to participants. By only admitting lowincome people who have difficulty getting jobs, it implicitly sends a message that "these are people who have had poor success in the labor market." This program, however, effectively counterbalances this potential
2 See HoWARD

S.

BLOOM ET AL., THE NATIONAL JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIP ACT

(1991); GEORGE
CAVE & FRED DOOurrLE, ASSESSING JOBSTART (1991).
3 James E. Rosenbaum, Linkages for Aiding the High School to Work Transition
(Apr. 18-20, 1997) (presented at conference on New Passages Between Education and
Work in a Comparative LifeCourse Cycle, Center for Int'l Studies, Univ. of Toronto) (on
file with author).
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stigma by certifying that all participants have a high school diploma (or
GED) and no drug problems. These selection criteria permit the program
to certify to employers that every graduate of this program has these
positive qualities. Applicants who do not meet its criteria are referred to
other programs to get special services for high school equivalency, drug
rehabilitation, etc. Moreover, by requiring near-perfect attendance, good
work habits, and training strong skills, the program offers further certification that its graduates will be good workers. As a result, Focus/Hope
has succeeded in becoming a preferred provider of highly-paid, skilled
workers in the auto industry.
While Focus/Hope has done careful thinking about the needs of its
job training, no one has done much thinking about the needs of residential mobility programs. Indeed, until recently, there have not been many
examples to consider. In the last few years, however, a number of residential mobility programs have arisen. Few of them have been carefully
studied, but some descriptions of their operation can provide some clues
about the underlying conditions that make them work.
After reporting research on the outcomes of the Gautreaux Residential Mobility Program (the Gautreaux Program or the Program), this paper describes how the Program provided certification of clients' qualities
and used that certification to persuade landlords to accept them. Next
this paper examines several other residential mobility programs. All of
these programs involve mixed-income integration, and most also involve
racial integration. This paper explores the ways they provided certification and warranties of their clients. Finally, this paper then turns to
some very recent programs that have not placed much emphasis on certification and this paper speculates about potential difficulties that might
arise.
II. THE GAUTREAUX RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY PROGRAM
The Gautreaux Residential Mobility Program in Chicago is one of
the largest and oldest residential mobility programs. The Program gives
low-income blacks housing vouchers to move to many different kinds of
communities, including white, middle-income suburbs and black, lowincome, city neighborhoods. Participants are assigned to their new city
or suburban locations in a quasi-random manner; program officials place
residents according to availability, and do not generally consider residents' preferences or try to match particular types of residents to particular types of communities. Thus we can see the differential effects of
being placed in the city or the suburbs. The research found that suburban movers had better outcomes than city movers on all measured outcomes: employment, education and, social integration.
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A. The Program
The Gautreaux Program is the result of a 1976 Supreme Court decision in a lawsuit against the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) on behalf of public housing residents. 4 The
suit charged that "these agencies [HUD and the Chicago Housing
Authority] had employed racially discriminatory policies in the administration of the Chicago low-rent public housing program." 5 Administered by the non-profit Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities in Chicago, the Gautreaux Program allows public housing
residents and those who had been on the waiting list for public housing to
receive Section 8 housing certificates 6 and move to private apartments
either in mostly-white suburbs or in the city of Chicago.
The Program provides extensive placement services. 7 Two full-time
real-estate staff worked to find landlords willing to participate in the program. Placement counselors then notified families as apartments became
available, counseled them about the advantages and disadvantages of
these moves, and took them to visit the units and communities. Since
1976, over 7000 families have participated, and over one-half have
moved to middle-income white suburbs.
Because of its design, the Gautreaux Program presents an unusual
opportunity to test the effect of helping low-income people move to better
labor markets, better schools, and better neighborhoods. The United
States does not have much experience with economic and racial integration of neighborhoods. Racial and economic homogeneity is the rule in
most neighborhoods, thus we generally do not know how low-income
blacks are affected by living in middle-income white neighborhoods.
Moreover, even when exceptions exist, we must suspect that Blacks who
break the residential barriers and move into white neighborhoods are
themselves unusual people, thus their subsequent attainments may reflect
more about themselves than about the effects of neighborhoods. Therefore, when researchers study black employment in suburbs, it is hard to
4 Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
5 KATHLEEN A. PEROFF Er AL., THE GAUTREAUX

ASSISTED HOUSING DEMON(1979).
The Section 8 program is a federal program that subsidizes low-income

STRATION:
6

AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS

people's rents in private sector apartments, either by giving them a Section 8
certificate that allows them to rent apartments on the open market or by moving
them into a new or rehabilitated building where the owner has set aside some
units for low-income tenants.
7' In this paper, our program description applies to the first 14 years of the Program

(1976-1990). This is the program whose outcomes have been studied. After 1990, several elements of the Program changed, but little information is available about the outcomes of that program design.
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tell whether the suburbs increased black employment or whether the
Blacks who happen to live in suburbs are different, perhaps moving to
the suburbs after getting a job.'
Similarly, most studies of black
achievement in suburban schools cannot tell whether black children's
achievement is due to living in the suburbs or to some unmeasured family
assets or values that may have drawn these black families to the area.
In contrast, Gautreaux participants circumvent the ordinary barriers
to living in the suburbs, not by their jobs, personal finances, or values,
but by getting into the program that provides them with rent subsidies
that permit them to live in suburban apartments for the same cost as public housing. Moreover, unlike the usual case of black suburbanizationworking-class blacks living in working-class suburbs- Gautreaux permits
low-income blacks to live in middle-income white suburbs. 9 Participants
move to a wide variety of over 115 suburbs throughout the six-counties
surrounding Chicago. Neighborhoods (i.e., census tracts) with less than
70% Whites are excluded and very high-rent suburbs are excluded by
funding limitations of Section 8 certificates. Yet these constraints leave a
large number and variety of suburban neighborhoods available to the
Program. The receiving suburbs range from working class to upper middle class and located throughout the six-county area.
The Program tries to move more than one family to any neighborhood to provide some social support, but it also avoids moving many
families to any neighborhood. While the Program mandates do not specify how many families could move to any location, the program tries to
avoid sending disproportionate numbers to any one community to prevent
overcrowding (and potential backlash), and in fact it succeeds in this
goal.10 As a result, the Program had low visibility and low impact on receiving communities.
Applying for the Program is largely a matter of luck and persistent
telephone dialing on registration day because many more people try to
call than can get through on the telephone lines. The Program also has
three selection criteria. It tries to avoid overcrowding, late rent payments, and building damage by.not admitting families that are large, or
have large debts or unacceptable housekeeping habits. But none of these
criteria eliminated large numbers of applicants, and all three only reduced
s See Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, Residential Segregation, Job Proximity,
and Black Job Opportunities: The Empirical Status of the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis
(Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, Working Paper
1989).
9 See id.
10 See Paul Fischer, Is Housing Mobility an Effective Anti-Poverty Strategy? (Report
to the Stephen H. Wilder Foundation (1991)) (on file with author).
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the eligible pool by about one-third. Although these selection criteria
make this an above average group compared to housing project residents,
they are not a "highly creamed" group. All are very low-income blacks,
are current or former welfare recipients, and have generally lived most of
their lives in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods.
In any case, the Program's procedures create a quasi-experimental
design. In principle, participants have choices about where they move,
but in actual practice the Program assigns the participants to city or suburb locations in a quasi-random manner. Apartment availability is determined by housing agents who do not deal with clients and whose activities are unrelated to client interest. Counselors offer clients units as
they become available according to their position on the waiting list, regardless of clients' locational preference. Although clients can refuse an
offer, very few do because they are unlikely to get another offer. As a
result, participants' preferences for city or suburbs have little to do with
where they end up moving.l"
B. Adults' and Childrens' Studies: Methods and Sample
The studies of the Gautreaux Program compared families moving to
white middle-income suburbs with families moving to middle and lowincome city neighborhoods. The city movers are a good comparison
group for judging the effects of the suburban move because both groups
meet the same selection criteria and receive improved housing. But city
movers are a particularly stringent comparison group because these movers receive better housing and move to better city neighborhoods than
they had in the housing projects. We expect that housing-project residents would fare considerably worse than either of the Gautreaux groups.
In effect, the suburban effects (relative to city movers) in this study may
be considered "lower-bound" effects.
To examine adults' employment, we surveyed 332 adults and conducted detailed interviews with another 95 individuals. The childrens'
study interviewed one randomly selected school-aged child (aged 8-18)
from each of 114 families in 1982 and followed up with the same children in 1989, when they were adolescents and young adults, and examined their educational and employment outcomes. 2 As implied by the
"

Cf. Tables la and lb.

12 Low-income people move often and they are therefore difficult to locate
over a seven-year period. We located 59.1 %, a reasonably large percentage for
such a sample. Of course, one must wonder what biases arise from this attrition,
and whether we were more likely to lose the least successful people (because they
were harder to find) or the most successful ones (because they got jobs in distant
locations). We suspect both happen, but if one happens more often, then the
1989 sample could be seriously different from the original 1982 sample.
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quasi-random assignment procedure, suburban
and city movers are highly
3
similar in most attributes in both samples.'
C. The Effects on Adult Employment
There are a number of reasons to expect that low-income blacks may
not get jobs in the suburbs despite the superior suburban economic opportunities. Virtually all of the mothers in Gautreaux have received public aid, most for five years or more, many have never had a job, and onehalf grew up in families on public aid. They may lack the skills, motivation, or work experience necessary to obtain work. Moreover, they may
face discrimination in the suburban labor market. 14 In addition, Gautreaux adults were educated in poor urban schools, and many lack job
training and job experience.
In spite of these difficulties many adults found jobs, and suburban
movers were more likely to have jobs than city movers. Suburban movers were over 25% more likely to have had a job after moving than city
movers, although the two groups had almost equal rates pre-move. After
moving, 50.9% of city movers had a job compared to 63.8% of suburban
movers. Moreover, among respondents who had never been employed
before their move, 46% found work after moving to the suburbs while a
comparable figure for the city was only 30%. For this group of "hardcore unemployed," suburban movers were much more likely to have a
job after moving than city movers. City and suburban movers, however,
15
did not differ in hourly wages or number of hours worked per week.
When asked how the suburban move helped them obtain jobs, all
suburban participants mentioned the greater number of jobs in the suburbs. Improved physical safety was the second most mentioned factor.
Adults reported that they did not work in the city because they feared
being attacked on the way home from work, or they feared that their
children would get hurt or get in trouble with gangs. The suburban move
allowed mothers to feel safe enough to go out and work. Many adults
also mentioned that positive role models and social norms inspired them
to work, supporting William J. Wilson's contention about the importance
of these factors.' 6 Seeing neighbors work, suburban Gautreaux adults reported that they felt that they too could have jobs, and they wanted to try
13 See Tables la and lb.
14

See generally

OSCAR LEWIS,

The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING

POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Daniel Patrick Moynihan ed.,
1968); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITzENSIP (1986).
"S See Table 2b.
16 See WILuAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
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to obtain employment. In the city, few adults mentioned neighbors
working.
In sum, the employment rates of suburban movers surpassed those
of city movers, particularly for those who had never previously held a
job. Whatever prevented some people from being employed in the pastlack of opportunity, safety, skills, or motivation-was not irreversible,
and many took jobs after moving to suburbs. This program helped close
the gap between low-income black adults and their white middle-income
neighbors.'17
D. The Effects on Youth
Housing moves may have even greater impact on children than on
adults because children are in a more formative stage and are still in
school. Being less mature, however, children may have even more difficulty coping with the challenges posed by the suburban move. Certainly
one can imagine abundant risks. The children lack the home advantages
of their suburban classmates, which might lead to social difficulties, or
these low-income black youth might face rejection and harassment from
their middle-income white classmates. Furthermore, their city schools
may not have prepared them for the more demanding suburban schools,
causing educational setbacks that might have permanent implications, or
childrens' low-income background may make them less prepared or less
motivated than middle-income suburban children; 8 they may have attitudes and habits deemed "undesirable" by suburban teachers and employers. Finally, racial discrimination may deny them full access to suburban
resources. For any or all of these reasons, the suburban children may
have lower achievement than their city counterparts who do not face such
barriers. On the other hand, suburban movers might benefit from better
educational resources and greater employment prospects in the suburbs,
and their fellow suburban students may create positive peer pressure for
achievement. We do not know which process will operate or, if both do,
which will win out.
" Multivariate analyses on post-move hourly wages and on hours worked per
week (controlling for the same variables, plus months of employment and the
pre-move measure of the dependent variable [wages or hours, respectively]) confirm the above findings: Suburbs have no effect on either dependent variable.
Job tenure, pre-move pay, and the two "culture of poverty" variables (internal
control and long-term AFDC) have significant effects on post-move wages. Job
tenure, pre-move hours worked, and post-move higher education have significant
effects on post-move hours worked. None of the other factors had significant effects. For details of these analyses see generally James E. Rosenbaum et al., Social Integrationof Low-Income Black Adults in Middle-Class White Suburbs, 38

Soc. PRons. 448-61 (1991).
18 See supra note 14.

1434

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1426

In 1982, we studied how the Gautreaux Program affected children,
comparing Gautreaux children who moved to low-income, black areas of
the city and those who moved to the suburbs. 19 The two groups were
similar in average age, proportion of males, and mothers' education. The
families were predominantly female-headed in both the suburban (86%)
and city (88%) groups.
We found that suburban movers initially had difficulty adapting to
the higher expectations in the suburban schools, and their grades suffered
in their first years at the new schools, while the city movers did not have
these difficulties. By the time of our study, however, after one to six
years in the suburbs, their grades and relative school performance
(judged by their mothers) were the same as those of city movers.
Moreover, our 1989 follow-up study2 ° showed that suburban schools had
substantially higher standards than the city schools, thus the same grades
imply higher achievement. In addition, compared to city movers, suburban movers had smaller classes, higher satisfaction with teachers and
courses, and better attitudes about school. Although the mothers noted
instances of racial bias from teachers, the suburban movers were also
more likely than city movers to state that teachers went out of their way
to help their children, and the suburban movers mentioned many instances of teachers giving extra help in classes and after school.
We also found that by the time of our study suburban movers had
virtually the same grades as city movers (a C+ average in city and suburbs). Because the national High School and Beyond (HSB) survey of
high school sophomores indicates that suburban students get about a onehalf grade lower than city students with the same achievement test scores,
the grade parity of the two samples implies a higher achievement level of
suburban movers. 2'
Most high schools offer different curricula to college-bound and
non-college-bound youth; this affects college opportunities,2 2 and we expected suburban youth to be less likely to be placed in college tracks than
their city counterparts. Researchers have found that Blacks are under-

19 See James E. Rosenbaum et al., White Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-

Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and Problems, 20 URB. REv. 28-41 (1988);
James E. Rosenbaum et al., Low-Income Black Children in White Suburban Schools: A

Study of School and Student Responses, 56 J. NEGRO EDUC. 35 (1987).
20 See Julie E. Kaufman & James E. Rosenbaum, The Education and Employment of
Low-Income Black Youth in White Suburbs, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS

229-40 (1992).
21 See id.
22 See

generally JAMES
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represented in college tracks in racially integrated schools. 23 Indeed, after being desegregated, the Washington, D.C. public school system initiated a tracking system, which a court ruled was undercutting integration. 24 Given the higher standards and greater competition in suburban
schools, we might expect suburban movers to be less likely than city
movers to be in college-track classes. The results showed the opposite.
Suburban movers were more often in college tracks than city movers
(40.3% vs. 23.5%).
We also found that suburban movers finished more years of education than city movers. More city movers dropped out of high school than
did suburban movers (20% in the city vs. less than 5% in the suburbs).
Suburban movers had significantly higher college enrollment than city
movers (54% vs. 21%), and, among those in college, suburban movers
are more likely to attend four-year colleges than are city movers (27%
vs. 4%). While transfers to four-year colleges are theoretically possible
for those in one-year schools or two-year colleges, in fact trade schools
almost never lead to four-year colleges, and two-year colleges rarely do.
Only 12.5% of students in the Chicago city colleges ultimately complete
a four-year college degree (less than one-half the rate of some suburban
community colleges in the area.25
For those youth not in college, a significantly higher proportion of
the suburban youth had full-time jobs than city youth (75% vs. 41.4%).
Suburban youth also were four times as likely to earn over $6.50/hour
than city youth (21% vs. 5%) and significantly more likely to receive job
benefits than city youth (55.2% vs. 23.1%).
In terms of social adjustment, we expected worse outcomes for the
suburban youth. First, we expected suburban youth to experience more
harassment than the city movers, but we found this to be mostly untrue.
In terms of the most common form of harassment, name-calling, 51.9%
of the Gautreaux suburban youth reported at least one incident in which
they were called names by white students. Of course, the city movers
were in predominantly black schools, so they were not called names by
Whites, but 41.9% of the city movers experienced name-calling by
classmates. On the other hand, in terms of more serious harassment,
while many (15.4%) of the suburban movers reported being threatened

23 See generally JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK:
How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE
INEQUALITY (1985). See also JAMES S. COLEMAN Er AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966); James E. Rosenbaum & Stefan Presser, Voluntary Racial Integration in a Magnet School, 86 U. CHI. SCH. REv. 156-86 (1978).

2 See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
25See Gary Orfield et al., The Chicago Study of Access and Choice in Higher Education:
A Report to the Illinois Senate Committee on Higher Education (1984).
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by classmates a few times a year or more, slightly more (19.4%) city
movers were threatened this often. Finally, in terms of the most severe
indicator of harassment, most city and suburban movers stated they had
never been hurt by other students (93.5% city and 94.1% suburb).
Overall, harassment was more similar than expected. Furthermore, additional analyses show that suburban youth who were harassed by Whites
were also involved in positive social interactions with white classmates.
We expected suburban movers to feel less socially accepted than the
city movers. Having spent over six years in all-black urban housing
projects, these children have learned different habits and tastes than their
classmates, have fewer economic resources than their classmates, and
have a different skin color than most of their classmates. We anticipated
that suburban movers would have greater difficulty being accepted by
their classmates than city movers. We asked youth several different
questions on their social acceptance, the responses included: "I feel I am
a real part of my school" and "Other students treat me with respect."
We also asked: "Are you considered a part of the 'in-group'?"; "Do
others think you do not fit in?"; "Do others see you as popular?"; and
"Do others see you as socially active?". For each of these items, no significant differences were found between the city and suburban movers.
The majority of the children in both groups felt that they fit into their
schools socially, and were regarded by others as at least somewhat socially active and popular.
Similarly, we expected the suburban movers would have fewer
friends than city movers. Given that the suburbs were overwhelmingly
white, the suburban movers came in contact with fewer black peers than
city movers. Suburban movers, however, had almost as many black
friends as city movers (8.81 vs. 11.06, which is not a significant difference). Furthermore, the suburban movers had significantly more white
friends than city movers (7.37 vs. 2.37). While only 17.3% of the suburban youth reported no white friends, 56.3% of the city sample did (a
statistically significant difference). Only one of the city movers and one
of the suburban movers reported having no friends at all.
Moreover, suburban youth spent significantly more time with white
students outside of class than city movers. Compared with city movers,
the suburban movers were significantly more likely to do things outside
of school with white students, do homework with white students, and
visit the homes of white students. When asked how friendly white students were, the suburban movers again were significantly more positive
than the city movers. When the same questions were asked about socializing with black students, no significant differences existed between city
and suburban movers.
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To get an overview, two index variables were computed based on
the summed responses to each of the three items for interactions with
Whites and for interactions with Blacks. The findings suggest that the
suburban movers divided their time almost equally between Blacks and
Whites, while the city movers spent significantly more of their time with
Blacks than with Whites. The experience of the suburban movers seems
to reflect a more racially integrated peer network, despite the small numbers of Blacks in suburban schools. As one suburban mover reported,
"We went into a new school and had the opportunity to be with white
people, Indian people, just a mix of races and actually get to know people
and have people get to know you."
E. Implicationsfor Other Residential Mobility Programs
The Gautreaux Residential Mobility Program led to some rather impressive outcomes for the suburban movers in terms of employment, education and social integration of low-income blacks. It is a tempting
model to copy. Yet the Program is not simply one of moving poor people to the suburbs; there are a number of details about the Program that
may have contributed to its success. Similar programs that do not attend
to such details may be less successful. This section speculates how the
selection criteria may affect the programs' outcomes.
Of the many important details that made the Gautreaux Program
successful, we believe the most important, and most easily missed, is in
the selection of participants. To people who wish to help the poor, selection criteria are often viewed as abhorrent. Obviously, programs that
only "cream" the top few persons may succeed by accepting people who
would have done well without the program. Therefore, it is reasonable
to be skeptical of programs that cream off the very best applicants.
Yet selection criteria do not have to be highly exclusive. Creaming,
named for the process of taking the 4% of cream that collects at the top
of a bottle of whole milk, refers to any process that uses only the top few
cases. But the selection criteria used in Gautreaux take about two-thirds
of applicants: the vast majority of applicants were accepted. It is one
thing to use selection criteria to exclude 96% of potential participants; it
is entirely different to exclude a small fraction.
Advocates for the poor might suggest that the Program should take
everyone, especially the hardest cases, because they have the greatest
potential to benefit. This may be an appropriate strategy for programs
that are bilateral, that include only the assistance provider and the participant, and that can afford to assist the most needy. Regardless of who
the served population is, bilateral programs are mutually beneficial in
that participants receive benefits and providers fulfill a mission and re-
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ceive a paycheck. Trilateral programs, however, which require private
sector participants, such as landlords and community members, must take
those third party's needs into consideration; if third parties do not receive
benefits, as the other two actors do, they must at least be assured that
they will be no worse off for their involvement. If third party needs are
not considered, these private citizens are likely to refuse to participate
and the program will end. For instance, if new residents develop a
reputation for not paying rents, not taking care of their apartments, :or
causing other trouble, landlords may refuse to rent to the program's participants and communities may resist involvement in the program. If this
occurs, the program will fail, and no poor people will be helped.
Selection is essential to reassure third-party participants, such as
landlords or neighbors. Landlords are concerned about tenants who will
not pay rents or who will damage property. Neighbors worry about new
neighbors being noisy, inconsiderate, or even criminal. If programs can
reassure landlords and neighbors that low-income participants have been
screened to eliminate those with undesirable behaviors, then resistance is
less likely to occur. Furthermore, Gautreaux participants benefited substantially from assistance from neighbors. This purely voluntary action
is unlikely if the program sends participants with a reputation for disrupting neighborhoods. The benefits available to future participants may
be substantially dependent on the reputation created by those who were
previously in the program.
Screening performs two functions. First, it eliminates applicants
who are unlikely to meet the requirements demanded by the program and
the expectations of important third parties. Second, no less important,
screening-if done overtly-provides a formal certification of the positive qualities of participants. Advocates of the poor complain about the
unfair and untrue stereotypes that are attributed to low-income people.
Even if low-income people were somewhat more likely to have poor rent
paying records than middle-income people, the vast majority of lowincome people probably pay their rent regularly. A program that screens
participants can effectively militate against such stereotypes and certify
that participants have desired qualities.
Screening does not have to be highly selective "creaming," and it
does not have to promise perfection. It only has to promise that the risks
associated with program participants are no worse than those of the average person in the housing market. If this is achieved, the program is
more likely to get landlord and neighbor support.
The Gautreaux Program has had considerable success in placing
participants while gaining the continuing support of landlords, because
landlords' have come to trust the program. The Leadership Council's se-
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lection procedures became an unofficial certification about participants'
capabilities. The staff who contacted landlords reported that even landlords who harbored prejudices against the larger class of low-income
people felt they could trust the people selected by the Leadership Council. In effect, the Leadership Council informally certified participants in
ways that overcame landlords' prejudices.
Some would argue that it is demeaning for low-income residents to
have to submit to screening. Yet condominium and co-op boards regularly screen new tenants and buyers. Some argue that it is difficult for
low-income people to meet these criteria, yet this ignores Gautreaux's
finding that two-thirds of low-income applicants met a screen for regular
rent payment and taking care of their property. Some will complain that
this program does nothing for the remaining one-third. That is true, but
this program is not suitable for those who cannot pay their rent and take
care of their apartments. Other programs are needed to address these
problems. Nonetheless, such families would not last long in this program, and their failure might prompt landlords to leave the program as
well.
III. OTHER RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY PROGRAMS

Few residential mobility programs existed just ten years ago. Now
several programs have been initiated. While Gautreaux is still the main
program to receive systematic research attention, we have obtained some
information about several programs across the nation. Most of these
programs have not been rigorously studied, so most of these accounts are
based on reports by a single administrator. It would be desirable to have
more systematic research to document and elaborate these general features. In the meantime, these reports are the best information available,
and they are included because they help us explore the ideas we discovered in the Gautreaux Program.
All of these programs involve residential integration across incomes,
and some involve racial integration. As such, some demand cooperation
by private landlords, and most involve cooperation by middle-income
neighbors who are not obliged to support the programs. The information
we obtained suggests that these programs' use of screening seems to be
an important component of their success.
A.

Tent City, Boston

Tent City is a non-profit managed, mixed-income housing development located in central Boston. It is comprised of 25% market rate tenants who are unsubsidized (rents at $1000 per month or more), 50%
moderate income tenants who receive a small subsidy, and 25% subsi-
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dized, low-income tenants. Like most private apartment management,
Tent City would like its residents to include only people who will be
good tenants and good neighbors. To ensure good tenants, Tent City
states clear selection criteria including evidence of a good rent-payment
record, good credit history, and landlord references. Interestingly, the
community of residents was initially involved in selecting tenants, but no
longer does so as the management has shown itself to be capable of
making good choices. Furthermore, tenants can be evicted for serious
rule infractions including selling drugs or destroying property, the types
of activities that suggest chaos and are likely to cause residents to flee,
and minor disturbances lead to warnings. Thus, Tent City offers both
certification and a warranty, not only choosing reliable tenants, but also
having a back-up arrangement for evicting people when their decisions
are bad.
By addressing the concerns that market-rate people might have about
living with low-income people, Tent City has been remarkably successful
at maintaining a mixed income development since 1988. As a result of
these practices and its highly desirable location, Tent City has a long
waiting list of middle-class (market-rate) people seeking admission.26
B.

Lake ParcPlace, Chicago

In Chicago's mixed-income development, Lake Parc Place (LPP),
we again see this mixture of certification and warranty to attract and retain middle-income residents. This program was systematically studied
in 1993-1995, and the present account is based on the research in two reports. 27 LPP is a mixed-income public housing development, devised and
owned by the Chicago Housing Authority, in two high rise buildings.
One-half of the 282 high rise units in LPP are rented to low-income tenants, and the other half to families with 50-80% of median income. To
ensure that the building is safe, anyone with a record in drug or criminal
activity is excluded from admission and anyone caught in such activity is
evicted. Unlike Tent City, LPP is not located on prime real estate.
Nonetheless, it has been highly successful in attracting and retaining
working families, and these families expressed complete satisfaction with
the safety in the building. Indeed, many working families said that LPP
was safer than their previous apartments in the private sector. That LPP

2 (Telephone interview with Henry Joseph, Interim Director of Tent City Corporation (Oct. 18, 1995)).
27 See generally Shazia Rafiullah Miller, Order and Democracy, 9 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE (forthcoming 1998); James E. Rosenbaum et al., Lake Parc Place: The First
Four Years of a Mixed-Income Housing Program (Center for Urban Affairs and Policy
Research, Northwestern University, Working Paper 1995).
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could produce safe buildings was a particularly remarkable achievement
in light of the terrible violence that pervades most of the other housing
developments managed by the Chicago Housing Authority. Indeed, the
fact that the program could attract over 140 families who could have chosen private-sector apartments to live in public housing buildings was a
surprise to many observers.
C. HOME, Cincinnati
The Cincinnati HOME Program, like the Gautreaux Program, uses
Section 8 certificates to place over 700 black families in predominantly
white communities since 1984.28 The average destination census tract is
86% non-Hispanic White. The HOME Program conducts a mild screen
on clients and counsels those accepted to prepare them for what they will
encounter in their move. This process has been so successful that landlords now solicit the HOME Program for tenants saying that they would
prefer the program's low-income blacks over anonymous white renters. 29
In an era where housing discrimination is still a problem, this is remarkable.
D. Alameda County (California)Public Housing
One problem with Section 8 vouchers is that landlords are not always willing to take residents using them. The Alameda County
(California) Housing Authority has convinced landlords to take their lowincome (mostly Black) participants by assuring them that these tenants
will Work out, and even offering to help evict any tenant if the landlord
can prove the person has not met obligations. 30 Landlords usually have
great difficulty in evicting bad tenants, and they are particularly worried
about government programs that can add red tape to make evictions even
more difficult. The Alameda County Housing Authority has been successful at finding private sector apartments for its participants by providing a warranty that addresses landlords' concerns and promises to help
them evict tenants who do not live up to reasonable standards. While she
did not have specific numbers, the executive director believes that there
have been very few cases where the housing authority had to act on the
warranty, but the warranty had large effects in persuading many landlords to work with their program. Of course, this is the principle underlying any warranty-for a TV or toaster. It appears that this principle
Cf. Fischer, supra note 10.
29 (Conversation with Dotty Hall, Housing Counselor/ Landlord Outreach Specialist,
(Oct. 21, 1994)).
30 (Conversation with Ophelia Bascal, Executive Director of the Alameda County
Housing Authority, (Oct. 21, 1994)).

1442

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1426

can also work to improve acceptance of low-income tenants.
IV. ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR NEW PROGRAMS
The successes of the Gautreaux Program have led similar programs

to spring up nationwide. We have heard of many local areas that have
considered initiating such programs. While such isolated local initiatives
are intriguing, many areas have great difficulty figuring out how to design their programs, they lack the resources to gain know-how from pre-

vious programs, and they fail to research their progress and outcomes.
Consequently, these programs stumble into their procedures without
guidance, and their successes and failures generally go unseen.
An important contrast to this haphazard pattern is Moving to Opportunity (MTO) initiated by the federal government. It is one of the
most exciting of the new mobility programs. MTO enables residents of
public and assisted housing projects in high-poverty neighborhoods to
move to homes and apartment in low-poverty neighborhoods in five metropolitan areas across the United States. This program was developed
based on an extensive examination of the Gautreaux Program and lengthy
discussions with Gautreaux leaders and staff. This examination helped
the program to avoid many of the pitfalls of such programs, and it was
able to develop thoughtfully designed guidelines and procedures that are
likely to be of great help to local programs. Yet even this program,
which considered many factors, still raises some concerns.
Although the federal guidelines for MTO are clear in specifying income eligibility, they do not make any public claims about screening. In
particular, the federal guidelines do not explicitly exclude felons or destructive tenants. As a result, the original design of the MTO program
provided no way to certify participants to landlords or neighbors.
Thus, when politicians made false accusations against the MTO program in Baltimore, middle-class residents panicked over nightmarish visions of MTO placing felony criminals into their communities. The program guidelines offered no reassurance that it had taken steps to prevent
such visions from coming true. The resistance has now subsided in Baltimore, and it never occurred in the other four cities, but it would only
take a few
bad program participants to re-ignite controversy about the
31
program.
In fact, most MTO residents probably pose no danger to their new
31 Some observers have indicated that the panic in Baltimore was generated as a political issue to use in the 1994 election, and they note that the issue subsided after election
day. While it is very likely that certification would not have prevented demagoguery on
this issue, certification would have given advocates and the media clearer evidence to
combat mistaken fears.
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neighborhoods. Indeed, the first report on the MTO program found that
the most distinctive attribute that distinguished MTO applicants from the
average public housing resident was their fear of crime and their recent
experience at being victims of crime. "Nearly half of MTO applicants
(47.8 percent) said that they had been a victim of crime within the last six
months, . . . [while] only 5.4 percent of residents in the largest" public
housing authorities were.32 When asked their reasons for applying to
MTO, "more than half (54.8 percent) listed crime as their primaryI reason, and another 30.8 percent listed it as their secondary reason." 3 The
report describes one mother who was "desperate" to get out of public
housing because of the crime and drugs there; a stray bullet had shattered
her window one night. 34 Another mother in Baltimore, "was worried that
the illegal activity prevalent in the neighborhood would lure her 15-yearold son into a gang or the drug trade." 35 The report recounts similar stories from Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.
With over 85% of MTO applicants describing their motivation for
entering the program as escaping crime, MTO applicants are more similar to their new middle-class neighbors than they are like the criminals
their neighbors imagined them to be. If MTO had posed formal selection
criteria excluding felony criminals, the program would have excluded
very few applicants, and it would have provided a reassuring certification
to landlords and neighborhoods.
We must note that local administrators of MTO have the latitude for
adding such screening criteria and there are some indications that they
have done so. 36 In addition, the MTO Program Operations Manual explicitly authorizes the MTO counseling non-profits to stop providing
counseling services to families who do not show up for appointments, do
not show decent housekeeping skills, or have serious drug or alcohol
problems. This is a matter of judgment calls by the local non-profits
about whom they will work with and recommend to landlords.37 If the
non-profits decide not to work with a MTO recipient family, the family
does not lose their certificate, but they do not get the non-profit helping

32

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Expanding Housing

Choices for HUD-Assisted Families 11 (1996).
33

id.

34 See id.
31 Id. at 15.
36 (John Goering, Policy Development and Research, United States Department of

Housing and Urban Development, personal communication, (Dec. 23, 1996)) (on file
with author).
37 (Margery Turner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary, United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, personal communication, (Dec. 17, 1996)) (on file
with author).
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them or vouching for them with landlords.
Thus, while the federal guidelines offer no certification, they offer
local administrators latitude to do so. At present, HUD does not yet
know how selection and certification are being handled by the various locations and to what extent these practices are being publicly announced to
communities, but some information on these issues is expected in a research report sometime in 1997. Thus, we can hope that local MTO
agencies are doing some certification and announcing it to their local
landlords and communities.
The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) provides another example.
The CHA has also noted the benefits of the area's Gautreaux Program
without noticing the details that have helped make it effective. CHA has
begun renovating and tearing down various buildings, and some displaced
tenants are being given Section 8 housing vouchers or certificates and encouraged to move into middle-income areas, including distant suburbs.
The program, however, is proceeding very quickly, and it has not
thought about what kinds of families can handle living in private apartments or what kinds of placements might undercut the program.
One top CHA administrator reported that he planned to give Section
8 certificates to the lowest income and most troubled families, arguing
that the Gautreaux experience indicated that suburbs could help these
families more than the city could. As we have stressed, this is not what
the Gautreaux experience indicated. That program required families to
have certain capabilities before moving to suburbs.
This administrator's comments are not official policy at this time,
but they represent the kind of thinking that could seriously harm residential mobility programs. While the most troubled families may get more
services in the suburbs, they might also antagonize their neighbors and
thereby reduce the amount of community assistance they might otherwise
receive. Moreover, they might jeopardize landlords' and communities'
willingness to accept future Section 8 tenants. If the CHA moves families with histories of poor rent paying or property destruction, evictions
and landlord resistance seem likely, and the entire movement for residential mobility could be seriously impaired.
In discussions of housing and job training programs, we have heard
some idealistic advocates urge that poverty programs should give a fresh
start to individuals who had previous criminal experiences if they state a
willingness to reform themselves. As nice as such stories of "rebirth"
may be, these gains must be balanced against their potential costs. If
programs do not publicly exclude individuals with criminal backgrounds,
they are unable to certify the non-criminal records of the vast majority of
their participants. This has a major cost to the program's reputation and
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to the vast majority of participants who are intent on escaping crime.
People with such backgrounds can benefit from second chances, but this
kind of program may not be the most appropriate way to help these individuals, and the program itself may be greatly harmed if it cannot certify
the quality of its participants.

A.

The Risk of Staff Improvising

Our review suggests that several successful residential mobility programs have developed explicit selection criteria for choosing their participants. Yet if this idea is as important as we claim for maintaining the
support of the third parties involved, it is likely that the staff members
have by necessity developed their own informal selection criteria. Based
on their observations of participants, staff often have their own ideas
about what is required to make the program work. If they have a personal stake in satisfying third parties (landlords, etc.), or if they are being held accountable for their success rate, staff will initiate screening or
other means of redirecting participants. 3' A number of studies have
shown that program staff often use their own discretion and alter programs in unanticipated ways. 39
While most programs try to discourage staff improvising, programs
may inadvertently encourage it by failing to provide clear guidelines
about necessary components of the job. 40 Specifically, programs that
have unrealistically low entrance requirements may put staff in a situation
where they feel they must improvise informal activities to do their jobs
and meet the expectations of those third-parties who are crucial to their
success. In some cases, program administrators may not even be aware
of what their staff are doing.
For example, in 1986, the HUD-sponsored Project Self-Sufficiency
(PSS) Program offered a combination of Section 8 housing certificates
and job placement through existing JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act)
programs to promote self-sufficiency. While HUD had few entrance requirements, not even high school equivalency, JTPA staff who implemented the job component believed that employers would stop offering
their clients jobs if they did not meet employers' expectations that workers must have high school diplomas (or GED equivalency) and other
work-related personal attributes (regular attendance, punctuality, task38 See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEvEL BUREAUCRACY (1980).
39 See generally LIPSKY, supra, note 38. See Richard Weatherly & Michael Lipsky,

Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education
Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 171-97 (1977); Soren Winter, Implementation of Danish
Youth Employment Policy, in FINDING WORK 109-38 (1986).
40 See LIPSKY, supra, note 38.
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completion, attention to quality). Consequently, JTPA staff developed
their own ad hoc screening procedures and side-tracked many PSS participants into "Job Club" activities
4' that were essentially a holding pattern
employment.
to
lead
not
did
that
The MTO program is currently running a similar risk. MTO staff
will need to maintain the support of private landlords by sending them
reliable tenants, and they can only be sure of doing so by using selection
criteria. Indeed, we have heard reports from one observer that some
MTO counselors have used selection criteria, side-tracking some participants who fail to keep their appointments or who show signs of dysfunctional behaviors. Indeed, MTO guidelines explicitly encourage such initiatives. Our aim is not to prejudge the program based on such casual
observations, and we do not have direct evidence of such behavior.
These observations of staff improvising, however, are just what is predicted.
Moreover, if such staff improvising behaviors occur, they may even
be good for the program and for most participants in some respects.
Like the JTPA staff, the MTO staff may be acting to improve their success in keeping rapport with their third-party contacts (landlords).
Yet the informality of these activities raises the risk of some unfortunate consequences. First, they are ad hoc, and thus likely to be done
differently by different staff, so they run risks of abuses, inconsistencies,
and unfairness. Second, clients do not know about them, so clients cannot prepare to meet these unstated expectations. Third, because these
selection criteria are unstated, landlords and neighbors may not know
about them, the program cannot promise landlords that they are certifying
clients even if staff are doing the informal equivalent of certification.
Even if staff express explicit certification promises to the landlords they
know (and we do not know whether they do or not), the staff's informal
improvising will not be public knowledge and it will not be known by
other landlords or neighbors.42
V.

CONCLUSION

The Gautreaux results show that residential mobility can significantly contribute to the aims of improving employment, education, and
41 See James E. Rosenbaum, An Analysis of Project Self-Sufficiency in Lake County
(1987).
42 If such informal screening is occurring, it will not affect the evaluation research of

MTO, which would discover the rate of program non-placements. The evaluation research, however, may not detect the reasons for non-placement. Just as landlords may
not know about such informal improvising, it may not be known by program administrators, policy makers, or researchers either.
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social integration of low-income blacks. The suburban move greatly improved adults'employment, and many adults got jobs for the first time in
their lives. The suburban move also improved youths' education. Compared with city movers, the children who moved to the suburbs are more
likely to be (1) in school; (2) in college-track classes; (3) in four-year
colleges; (4) in jobs; and (5) in jobs with benefits and better pay. The
children who went to college or who got jobs with benefits or better pay
are on the way toward upward mobility. The suburban move also led to
a considerable amount of social integration, friendships, and interaction
with white neighbors in the suburbs.
Successful residential programs, however, may require certain preconditions, including appropriate selection criteria. Just as Focus/Hope's
entrance requirements allowed this job training program to certify that all
clients satisfied employers' minimum requirements (drug-free, education,
etc.), successful residential mobility programs may have to employ certain selection criteria if they are to gain the cooperation of the third parties who are crucial to the programs' success: landlords and neighbors.
By careful choice of selection criteria, housing programs can certify that
their participants would make good tenants and neighbors. Indeed, we
reviewed some cases where housing programs served low-income families with a multitude of disadvantages (low education, single-parents,
etc.), yet these programs became preferred providers of tenants, avoided
neighbor resistance, and elicited neighbor support and cooperation for
their participants.
Obviously, no amount of certification is adequate to prevent all biases. Nearly every Gautreaux family that moved in the 1970s and early
1980s reported isolated incidents of racial biases and harassment. Yet it
was noteworthy that this harassment declined over time, and even before
it declined, nearly every suburban-mover who received harassment also
reported incidents of support and help by white neighbors-offering information, help, support, and friendship to mothers and children.43
Moreover, the incidence of harassment was not correlated with a lack of
neighbor support; the same families who were harassed often reported
support from white neighbors, sometimes as a direct response to the harassment. Indeed, some mostly white churches mobilized organized efforts to assist Gautreaux families with material goods and employment
assistance. While landlord support is vital to making placements happen,
neighbor support may be vital to the positive social outcomes we noted.
We suspect that if the Gautreaux families had been bad neighbors (noisy,
destructive, or otherwise troublesome), neighbors would have offered

43 See Rosenbaum et al., supra, note 17.
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less support.
Certainly, community reactions arise from both rational and irrational concerns. Certification probably will not reduce irrational prejudices, but certification can deal with legitimate concerns. Indeed, until
programs attempt to address potentially legitimate concerns of neighbors
and landlords, it is hard to know how much irrational prejudice is motivating community reaction. Programs that certify participants deprive
bigots of legitimate arguments, while denying them the support of people
with legitimate concerns.
We are not urging that programs should necessarily be announced;
perhaps the ideal is program invisibility, where people get residential
moves without being tagged as part of a government program, just as we
do not tag people who get disability benefits or disaster relief. When the
program has been announced to neighbors or to landlords, however, the
certification standards should be clearly presented as an integral part of
the program.
Our proposals are an extension of current policy efforts. Congress
and HUD have already taken steps to make housing programs more responsive by allowing landlords to evict recipients for the same reasons
they use for market rate clients. The steps we are urging extend these
efforts, effectively promising landlords before participation that the program has tried to reduce the likelihood that they will need to invoke
eviction procedures
Our argument should not be confused with the values argument,
which urges selection criteria that encourage poor people to conform to
conventional values. We are urging selection, not because it is "good,"
but because it is necessary in programs that require the support of third
parties. Our argument does not apply in direct services programs: programs that involve only two-parties, government and clients. Our argument applies when programs require the cooperation of third partiesemployers, landlords, or neighbors. Rebecca Blank urged that poverty
programs will be most effective if they have clear criteria and are targeted to individuals' specific needs. 44 Our call for appropriate selections
elaborates that view. Not only should programs be targeted to individuals who can benefit from them, they should also be targeted to those who
can satisfy third parties who are vital to the success of the programs and
participants.
There are important requirements to running a successful residential
mobility program; it is a serious disservice to the program and to participants to ignore these elements. Reasonable selection standards eliminate

44 See REBECCA BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION (1997).
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few individuals, but they have major benefits for all participants and for
the program itself. While it is compassionate to give people second
chances, placing people with bad credit histories or criminal records in
suburban neighborhoods is unlikely to be successful, and it may hurt the
vast majority of other participants who will be unfairly stigmatized by the
program's failure to certify their positive qualities. Even a few failures
can seriously damage a program's reputation and reduce landlord and
neighbor cooperation.

Table la. Characteristics of the Adult Study Sample: City-Suburban Comparison
Suburb
N=224

Sig.a

5.8

5.4

n.s.

Age

36.7

35.4

n.s.

Age of youngest child

9.6

7.8

**

Number of children

2.5

2.6

n.s.

Years of Education pre-move

11.7

11.9

n. s.

Years of Education post-move

12.5

12.3

n.s.

Marital Status
Married
Never Married

8.3%
44.4%

6.3%
44.6%

n.s.
n.s.

Getting AFDC

53.7%

47.8%

n.s.

Long-term AFDC recipientb

68.5%

59.8%

n.s.

Second Generation AFDC

51.9%

50.9%

n.s.

City
N=108
Years on Gautreaux

Table lb. Characteristics of the 1989 Children Sample: City-Suburban Comparison
City

Suburb

Age

18.2

18.8

Males

45.5%

56.8%

Mother not married

88%

86%

Mother education post-move

12.0

12.1

Mother finished high school

43%

47%

a. Significance of chi-square or t-test: *p<.01, **p<.01.
b. On AFDC for 5 years or more.

Sig.a

Table 2a. Percent of Respondents Employed Post-move by Pre-move Employment for
City and Suburban Moversa
Suburb Pre-Move

City Pre-Move
Emploved
Post-move
Employed

42
(64.6%)
Unemployed 23
(35.4%)
Total

65

Emoloved Unemployed Total

Unemooyed Total
Post-move
Employed

53

106
(73.6%)
Unemployed 38
(26.4%)

37
(46.2%)
43
(53.8%)

108

Total

80

13
(30.2%)
30
(69.8%)

55

43

144

Table 2b. City and Suburban Comparison on Wages and Hours Worked
Post-Move Mean

t

p

City Movers Post-move earners (N=55)
$5.04
Hourly wages
33.27
Hours/Week

$6.20
31.92

6.52
0.60

**

Suburban Movers Post-move earners (N=143)
$4.96
Hourly wages
33.62
Hours/Week

$6.00
33.39

6.50
0.60

**

n.s.

n.s.

Table 3. Youths' Education and Job Outcomes: City-Suburban Comparison
City Suburb
Drop-out of school

20%

College track

24% 40%

Attend college

21%

54%

Attend four-year college

4%

27%

Employed full-time (if not in college)

41%

75%

Pay under $3.50/hour
Pay over $6.50/hour

43% 9%
5% 21%

Job benefits

23% 55%

a. Significance of chi-square or t-test:

5%

81

224

a. Numbers in parentheses are column percentages.

Pre-Move Mean

143

Sig.a
*
**

**

*p< 10, **p<.05, ***p<.025, ****p<.0 0 5 .

